Internet Porn Censorship

Pornhub explains in a press release:

In line with other stakeholder groups, academics and public policy institutions, Aylo's assessment is that the Online Safety Act (OSA) has not achieved its intended goal of protecting minors. Effective February 2, 2026 Aylo will no longer participate in the failed system that has been created in the United Kingdom as a result of the OSA's introduction. Based on Aylo's data and experience, this law and regulatory framework have made the internet more dangerous for minors and adults and jeopardizes the privacy and personal data of UK citizens.

New users in the UK will no longer be able to access Aylo's content sharing platforms, including Pornhub, YouPorn, and Redtube. UK users who have verified their age will retain access through their existing accounts.

Statement by Alex Kekesi, VP Brand and Community, on behalf of Aylo:

We've made the difficult decision to restrict access to our sites (user-uploaded content platforms, including Pornhub, YouPorn, Redtube) in the United Kingdom.

As of February 2, 2026, our library of thoroughly moderated and consensual adult entertainment, on one of the most trusted adult sites in the world, will be restricted. Our sites, which host legal and regulated porn, will no longer be available in the UK to new users, but thousands of irresponsible porn sites will still be easy to access.

Aylo initially participated in the Online Safety Act (OSA) because we wanted to believe that a determined and prepared regulator in Ofcom could take poor legislation and manage to enforce compliance in a meaningful way, while offering more privacy preserving age assurance methods than we'd seen in other jurisdictions. Despite the clear intent of the law to restrict minors' access to adult content and commitment to enforcement, after 6 months of implementation, our experience strongly suggests that the OSA has failed to achieve that objective. We cannot continue to operate within a system that, in our view, fails to deliver on its promise of child safety, and has had the opposite impact. We believe this framework in practice has diverted traffic to darker, unregulated corners of the internet, and has also jeopardized the privacy and personal data of UK citizens.

In October we met with both the government department which authored the OSA, and the UK regulator responsible for enforcing it, to re-iterate our concerns about the law's vulnerabilities. We presented data and continued advocating for a device-based solution and are disappointed that despite the evidence shared, such little progress has been made, especially when an alternative and viable solution exists.

Aylo consulted with the regulator and was committed to giving the OSA every chance to succeed, but we believe Ofcom was given an impossible mandate. In our view, it is clear this is too big a challenge for any regulator to execute within the parameters of the Act. Based on our data and experience, effective enforcement is not possible, circumvention is rampant, privacy is compromised, and new, unregulated sites quickly fill any gaps left by responsible operators. In other jurisdictions, Aylo has often been one of the only major platforms to comply, only to see traffic diverted to even larger, non-compliant sites. Although larger operators are compliant, we believe the OSA has created an ecosystem where the vast majority of sites with age-inappropriate content are left unchecked. Users are turning to sites that do not have uploader verification measures and do not moderate content, leading to an increased risk of exposure to dangerous or illegal content. What is alarming about the top 10 Google and Bing search results for free porn in the UK is not just that more than half of the sites lack any age verification, but that the specific sites keep changing. (January 20, 2026) Search results are constantly replenished with new, non-compliant sites, demonstrating how easily new players can enter the market. This revolving door means the internet remains wide open to unmoderated, unverified and potentially unsafe content, regardless of how many times authorities attempt to crack down. The longer this goes on, these non-compliant sites are accessed by more minors and adults. As outlined by Lucy Faithfull Foundation, we know that when faced with age verification, some adults are choosing riskier, irresponsible sites to avoid age checks. Alternatively, they seek out solutions to circumvent restrictions by using virtual private networks (VPNs) to connect to the same websites via a different country.

We remain committed to working with the UK, European Commission and other international partners to ensure the lessons learned in the UK inform future policymaking. We continue to believe that to make the internet safer for everyone, every phone, tablet or computer should start as a kid-safe device. We've seen progress in this space with Apple's recent iOS 26.1 update, which enables built-in content filters to limit adult websites by default on existing minors' accounts and requires parental consent to disable them. This method blocks access to known adult content websites, cannot be circumvented with VPNs and does not introduce any data privacy risks. This is a big step for online safety that can go even further. We encourage all device manufacturers to make this the default setting on all devices, not just known minor accounts, to better protect everyone. Laws should mandate that only adults be allowed to unlock access to age-inappropriate content. We are determined to be part of this solution and want to collaborate with government, civil society and tech partners to arrive at an effective device-based age verification solution.

 

The BBC makes an interesting comment with reference to an upcoming censorship law that will ban choking and strangulation content on porn websites. How on earth are foreign porn websites expected to implement such a ban on material that is so commonplace, just for the UK. Perhaps the answer is to simply self block in the UK with the knowledge that keen UK users with a VPN can still access it.

The BBC article notes:

Anti porn campaigner Prof Clare McGlynn believes Pornhub would prefer VPN usage to having to regulate or moderate its content more, particularly as the UK looks to restrict more material. The UK government recently announced plans to make online porn showing strangulation or suffocation illegal.

On VPNs being used to get around checks, social media expert Matt Navara says Pornhub's decision to restrict UK access may be more about creating a legal firewall about restrictions than a protest. He said:

I think blocking UK access lets Pornhub dodge some of the regulations, skip the costs and still collect the traffic from users they can no longer see.

Ofcom writes:

Ofcom has set out the next steps in its investigation into X, and the limitations of the UKs Online Safety Act in relation to AI chatbots.

Ofcom was one of the first regulators in the world to act on concerning reports of the Grok AI chatbot account on X being used to create and share demeaning sexual deepfakes of real people, including children, which may amount to criminal offences.

After contacting X on 5 January , giving it a chance to explain how these images had been shared at such scale, we moved quickly to launch a formal investigation on 12 January into whether the company had done enough to assess and mitigate the risk of this imagery spreading on its social media platform, and to take it down quickly where it was identified.

Since then, X has said it has implemented measures to try and address the issue. We have been in close contact with the Information Commissioners Office, which is launching its own investigation. Other jurisdictions have also launched investigations in the weeks since we opened ours, including the European Commission on 26 January.

Our investigation remains ongoing and we continue to work closely with the ICO and others to ensure tech firms keep users safe and protect their privacy.

Not all AI chatbots are regulated

Broadly, the Online Safety Act regulates user-to-user services, search services and services that publish pornographic content.

Chatbots are not subject to regulation at all if they:

• only allow people to interact with the chatbot itself and no other users (i.e. they are not user-to-user services);

• do not search multiple websites or databases when giving responses to users (i.e. are not search services); and

• cannot generate pornographic content.

We are not investigating xAI at this time.

When we opened our investigation into X, we said we were assessing whether we should also investigate xAI, as the provider of the standalone Grok service. We continue to demand answers from xAI about the risks it poses. We are examining whether to launch an investigation into its compliance with the rules requiring services that publish pornographic material to use highly effective age checks to prevent children from accessing that content.

Because of the way the Act relates to chatbots, as explained above, we are currently unable to investigate the creation of illegal images by the standalone Grok service in this case.

Where we are in our X investigation

In our investigation into X, we are currently gathering and analysing evidence to determine whether X has broken the law, including using our formal information-gathering powers. The week after we launched our investigation, we sent legally binding information requests to X, to make sure we have the information we need from the company, and further requests continue to be sent.

Firms are required, by law, to respond to all such requests from Ofcom in an accurate, complete and timely way, and they can expect to face fines if they fail to do so.

We must give any company we investigate a full opportunity to make representations on our case. If, based on the evidence, we consider that the company has failed to comply with its legal duties, we will issue a provisional decision setting out our views and the evidence upon which we are relying. The company will then have an opportunity to respond to our findings in full, as required by the Act, before we make our final decision.

We know there is significant public interest in our investigation into X. We are progressing the investigation as a matter of urgency. We will provide updates and will be as open as possible during this process. It is important to note that enforcement investigations such as these take time -- typically months.

We must follow strict rules about how and when we can share information publicly, as is the case for any enforcement agency, and it would not be appropriate to provide a running commentary about the substantive details of a live investigation. Running a fair process is essential to ensuring that any final decisions are robust, effective, and that they stick.

While in the most serious cases of ongoing non-compliance we can apply for a court order requiring broadband providers to block access to a site in the UK, the law sets a high bar for such applications, and a specific process must be followed before we can do this. It would be a significant regulatory intervention and is not one we are likely to make routinely, given the impact it could have on freedom of expression in the UK.

A new survey of 1,469 adults, which was conducted by the child protection focused Lucy Faithfull Foundation, has noted that 45% of adults who dont want to verify their identities to access porn have turned to using sites without age checks. In addition, 29% have used Virtual Private Networks to bypass age checks on sites that have them.

Kerry Smith, CEO of the Foundation, said:

Its highly concerning that age verification measures are not being implemented on certain platforms. Safeguards on pornography sites are essential to protect children from accessing pornography, which we know, if viewed at a young age, can normalise harmful sexual behaviours and leave children more vulnerable to grooming from predators.

There needs to be strong enforcement of the Online Safety Act to ensure robust and meaningful safety measures are put in place on pornography platforms, including the use of deterrence messaging and signposting for adults to appropriate support services.

We would also encourage the government to bring in even more robust legislation, so online pornography is treated just as it is in the offline world.

An Ofcom spokesperson said

Change is happening, and the tide on online safety is beginning to turn for the better. Last year saw important changes for people, with new measures across many sites and apps now better protecting UK users from harmful content, particularly children. But we need to see much more from tech companies this year, and well use our full powers if they fall short.

Ofcom does have the power to impose significant financial fines, although there remains a question mark as to how much impact this will have on non-UK based sites. The regulator could also ask broadband ISPs and mobile operators to block the sites at network-level, although this would have little impact on VPN users.

Overall, its hardly surprising or controversial that many adults do not want to have to share their private personal or financial details with unknown and unregulated third-party age verification providers, particularly when those services are associated with porn peddlers. The infamous Ashley Madison hack showed just how dangerous such information could be in the wrong hands (countless cases of blackmail and suicide etc.).

Pornhub writes:

Overview.

A recent cybersecurity incident involving data from a third-party data analytics service provider has impacted some Pornhub Premium users. Specifically, this situation affects only select Premium users. It is important to note this was not a breach of Pornhub Premium's systems. Passwords, payment details, and financial information remain secure and were not exposed.

What Happened.

We recently learned that an unauthorized party gained unauthorized access to analytics data stored with Mixpanel, a third-party data analytics service provider. The unauthorized party was able to use this unauthorized access to extract a limited set of analytics events for some users. This was not a breach of Pornhub Premium's systems. No passwords, credentials, payment details or government IDs were compromised or exposed and we have since secured the affected account and stopped the unauthorized access.

Potential User Contact. We are aware that the individuals responsible for this incident have threatened to contact impacted Pornhub Premium users directly. You may therefore receive emails claiming they have your personal information. As a reminder, we will never ask for your password or payment information by email.

What We Are Doing.

Upon becoming aware of this event, we immediately launched a comprehensive internal investigation with the support of our cybersecurity experts. We have engaged with relevant authorities and with Mixpanel so that we can provide you with facts. We are working diligently to determine the nature and scope of the reported incident.

What You Can Do.

While our investigation is ongoing, we encourage all users to remain vigilant by monitoring their accounts for any suspicious emails or unusual activity.

Australia has activated a new requirement for search engines to verify the ages of their signed-in users, with companies now facing a six-month countdown to full compliance.

The rule, which began on December 27, sits within a newly registered industry code under the authority of the eSafety Commissioner and extends the countrys expanding system of online censorship controls.

Search services such as Google and Bing must soon introduce age-assurance checks when logged-in users perform searches that might surface adult or otherwise high-impact material. The mechanisms vary, but common approaches include prompting users to confirm their age through a pop-up screen or submitting an official document, credit card details, or digital ID.

For those not logged in, searches will still function, but some content may appear blurred. Logged-in users under 18 will automatically receive filtered results excluding topics the government labels as harmful.

Ofcom writes:

Since the age check rules came into force, there has been considerable public debate about children bypassing the protections, including by using virtual private networks (VPNs). VPN use is common in the UK and can offer privacy and security benefits. However, because VPNs allow internet users to change their virtual location and IP address to another country, they can be used to try and get around the protections of the Online Safety Act, including its age check requirements.

 Following the introduction of the age check requirement in July we saw an initial spike in the use of VPNs in the UK – with UK daily active users of VPN apps doubling to around 1.5 million. However, by the end of October usage had fallen back to under 1 million daily active users.21 This early spike in VPN usage was expected and has happened in other countries and US states that have introduced age check requirements. There is currently no reliable up-to-date data on how far the increased use of VPNs is due to children or to adults who wish to avoid having to complete age checks.

Data from Internet Matters, collected before the rules came into force, suggests that around one in ten under-18s used VPNs, with use skewing towards older teenagers. This would suggest the new age checks will already be offering significant protections to children. However, further evaluation is needed.

We continue to build our evidence base to help us understand children’s level of usage and familiarity with VPNs. This month we are launching a children’s advisory panel with the Children’s Commissioner for England to hear directly from children about their online experiences and how they are changing, including VPN usage. We have introduced questions on VPNs to our Children and Parents Media Literacy Tracker and we plan to publish data and analysis on this in May 2026. These questions focus on the awareness and use of VPNs among children aged 13-17. We also ask parents of 3-17s who use parental controls, whether they use tools to block VPN usage. Finally, we will continue to collect information about VPN adoption in the UK, as we have done since age assurance measures came into force, as part of our work to understand how people in the UK use the internet. This evidence base will help guide thinking and decisions about whether there is a need for further action in this area, and what would be proportionate.

There has also been concern from some stakeholders about whether age checks are being implemented in a way that preserves privacy and protects users’ data. Ofcom has been clear that all age assurance methods involve processing of some personal data and therefore platforms and vendors implementing age checks must comply with UK data protection laws. We have worked closely with the Information Commissioner’s Office, which oversees and enforces these laws, in developing our approach and guidance for highly effective age checks.

Finally, we have observed instances of over-moderation where content not harmful to children was inaccessible to them, especially soon after age checks were more broadly introduced. We have provided clear, detailed guidance on what kinds of content we consider to be illegal content or content harmful to children – and therefore consider to be in-scope of safety measures. Where we are concerned that content which does not meet these definitions is inaccessible, we are discussing these issues with the providers involved through our Supervision teams.

Baroness Benjamin Liberal Democrat;

To ask His Majesty's Government what measures have been put in place to prevent children using virtual private networks to avoid age verification to access harmful material online.

Baroness Lloyd of Effra Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology),

The Online Safety Act requires services to use highly effective age assurance to prevent children in the UK from encountering harmful content. ofcom's guidance makes it clear that age assurance must be robust to prevent circumvention. Services must also take steps to mitigate against circumvention methods that are easily accessible to children. Providers that do not comply with their child safety duties by deliberately promoting the use of VPNs could face enforcement action under the Act.

Baroness Benjamin

I thank the Minister for that Answer. However, Childnet has discovered an increase in the use of VPNs by children in the last three months. While younger children are deterred by age-verification checks, teenagers actively seek out and share methods to circumvent them. Many minors are downloading free VPN applications that often monetise user data and expose devices to viruses. Also, by relocating to countries with few or no internet safety Laws, children can be exposed to more extreme, illegal or unmoderated content. Perhaps children under 16 should be banned from social media altogether. What action will the Government take to address the increasing number of children using VPNs? Will they instruct ofcom to follow the lead of the Australian e-safety commissioner and require that digital services check VPN traffic for technical and behavioural red flags that suggest a user in the UK may be a child? Let us act sooner rather than later.

Baroness Lloyd of Effra

We recognise the international efforts to better protect children online, including in Australia, and we are working with the Australian Government to understand the impact of their policies, including that one. There is currently limited evidence on how many children use VPNs, and the Government are addressing this evidence gap. We welcome any further evidence in this area, such as that quoted by the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, to complement our understanding. The Government will ensure that we act where we need to, as we have seen in other areas, and that future interventions are proportionate and evidence based.

...

Lord Carlile of Berriew Chair, Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee

On the Radio 4 Today programme this morning, ofcom admitted that none of the three fines levied so far has been paid. Is it not right that Ofcom should be encouraged to take much stronger enforcement action against those who do not pay by making it clear that within a very short time, they will lose their right to appear on any screen in the United Kingdom unless their enforcement is fit for purpose?

Australian internet censors will enforce a new rule that basically requires search engines into safe mode for unlogged in users and require ID/age verification to login.

Under the new rules, search results that include pornography or extreme violence will be blurred by default for users under 18, or for anyone using search without logging in. At the same time, search engines must verify the age of logged-in users. If the user is identified as a minor, safe search settings, filtering out pornography, high-impact violence and disordered-eating content, must be applied automatically.

In addition, searches by Australians related to suicide, self-harm or eating disorders will now automatically redirect to mental health support services.

The new censorship rules will kick in on December 27 2025.

People will not need an account to search the internet. The codes do not require users to log in, and they do not notify the government about what people are searching. For users who are logged in, age assurance mechanisms will be used, possibly including ID/age verification. Adults will still be able to access content if they choose. Blurred images can be clicked through to view, but only once the user accepts they are over 18.

Ofcom has fined the AVS Group of porn websites £1,050,000 with an ultimatum to fix its ID/age verification system by 6th December else it will face daily files of £1300 for 3 months or until it fixes its websites.

The AVS Group did in fact implement ID/Age verification for UK visitors which requires a verifiable email and a photo for age estimation. However ths system did not check that this was a selfie and any photo of an any adult seems to suffice.

The AVS Group Ltd sites are:

• pornzog.com
• txxx.com, txxx.tube
• upornia.com
• hdzog.com, hdzog.tube
• thegay.com, thegay.tube
• ooxxx.com
• hotmovs.com
• hclips.com
• vjav.com
• pornl.com
• voyeurhit.com
• manysex.com
• tubepornclassic.com
• shemalez.com, shemalez.tube.

These sites still require for UK viewers a valid email and a photo of an adult but are available using a VPN.

The BBC notes that Ofcom has never received any replies from queries to TubeCorporate, the company behind AVS Group Ltd. TubeCorporate apparently has a registered address in Belize that is shared with many other offshore companies, and it may prove difficult to enforce these fines.

 

Ofcom writes:

Ofcom has determined that AVS Group Ltd has failed to comply with section 12 of the Act and this failure is ongoing. Section 12 imposes a duty on providers of services that fall under Part 3 of the Act, and allow pornographic content, to ensure that children are prevented from encountering pornographic content through the use of highly effective age assurance.

From 25 July 2025 until at least 25 November 2025, each of the AVS Group websites either:

• did not implement any age assurance measures; or

• implemented measures that were not highly effective at determining whether a user was a child. In particular, AVS Group Ltd deployed a photo upload check on its services that does not include liveness detection and as such is vulnerable to circumvention by children (for example, by uploading a photo of an adult). Ofcom considers that this method is not capable of being highly effective within the meaning of the Act.

We are imposing a penalty on AVS Group Ltd of £1,000,000 in respect of the contravention of section 12. This penalty was set having regard to our Penalty Guidelines.

In addition, AVS Group Ltd is now required to comply with section 12 by taking steps to implement highly effective age assurance on all remaining AVS Group websites that do not currently have such measures in place by 5pm GMT on 6 December 2025.

Should AVS Group Ltd fail to comply with this requirement, a daily rate penalty of £1,000 per day will be imposed starting from 6 December 2025 until the section 12 duty is complied with or 16 March 2026, whichever is sooner.

Ofcom has also determined that AVS Group Ltd has failed to comply with section 102(8) of the Act by failing to respond to a statutory request for information within the specified time frame issued as part of the investigation. We are imposing a penalty on AVS Group Ltd of £50,000 in respect of the contravention of section 102(8). This penalty was set having regard to our Penalty Guidelines.

In addition, AVS Group Ltd is now required to take immediate steps to provide Ofcom with a complete list of all sites operated by AVS Group Ltd.

Should AVS Group Ltd fail to comply with this requirement, a daily rate penalty of £300 per day will be imposed starting from 4 December 2025 until the section 102(8) duty is complied with or 1 February 2026 whichever is sooner.