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Offsite Article: Online Privacy at Risk from Awful U.K. Internet Regulation Bill...


Link Here 6th August 2023
Full story: Online Safety Bill...UK Government legislates to censor social media
The legislation is also terrible on free speech and poses global risks.

See article from reason.com

 

 

A new snooper's charter...

The Online 'Safety' Bill is not the only threat to British people's internet privacy and security


Link Here20th July 2023
Full story: UK Government vs Encryption...Government seeks to restrict peoples use of encryption
Apple says it will remove services such as FaceTime and iMessage from the UK rather than weaken security if new UK government proposals are made law and acted upon.

The government is seeking to update the Investigatory Powers Act (IPA) 2016. It wants messaging services to clear security features with the Home Office before releasing them to customers. The act lets the Home Office demand security features are disabled, without telling the public. Under the update, this would have to be immediate.

Currently, there has to be a review, there can also be an independent oversight process and a technology company can appeal before taking any action.

WhatsApp and Signal are among the platforms to have opposed a clause in the Online Safety Bill allowing the communications regulator to require companies to install technology to scan for child-abuse material in encrypted messaging apps and other services.

The government has opened an eight-week consultation on the proposed amendments to the IPA. , which already enables the storage of internet browsing records for 12 months and authorises the bulk collection of personal data.

Apple has made a  9 page submission to the current consultation opposing the snooping proposal:

It would not make changes to security features specifically for one country that would weaken a product for all users. Some changes would require issuing a software update so could not be made secretly The proposals constitute a serious and direct threat to data security and information privacy that would affect people outside the UK.

 

 

Running riot over people's freedom...

French government proposes extreme internet censorship law to force browsers to block all websites on a French government controlled list


Link Here1st July 2023
Full story: Internet Censorship in France...Web blocking in the name of child protection
Mozilla, the foundation that produces the Firefox browser explains:

In a well-intentioned yet dangerous move to fight online fraud, France is on the verge of forcing browsers to create a dystopian technical capability. Article 6 (para II and III) of the SREN Bill would force browser providers to create the means to mandatorily block websites present on a government provided list. Such a move will overturn decades of established content moderation norms and provide a playbook for authoritarian governments that will easily negate the existence of censorship circumvention tools.

While motivated by a legitimate concern, this move to block websites directly within the browser would be disastrous for the open internet and disproportionate to the goals of the legal proposal -- fighting fraud. It will also set a worrying precedent and create technical capabilities that other regimes will leverage for far more nefarious purposes. Leveraging existing malware and phishing protection offerings rather than replacing them with government provided, device level block-lists is a far better route to achieve the goals of the legislation.

The rest of the post will provide a brief overview of the current state of phishing protection systems in browsers, the distinction between industry practices and what the draft law proposes, and proposes alternatives to achieve the goals of the legislation in a less extreme manner.

It might seem that current malware and phishing protection industry practices are not so different from the French proposal. This is far from the truth, where the key differentiating factor is that they do not block websites but merely warn users about the risks and allow them to access the websites if they choose to accept it. No such language is present in the current proposal, which is focused on blocking. Neither are there any references to privacy preserving implementations or mechanisms to prevent this feature from being utilized for other purposes. In fact, a government being able to mandate that a certain website not open at all on a browser/system is uncharted territory and even the most repressive regimes in the world prefer to block websites further up the network (ISPs, etc.) so far.

Forcing browsers to create capabilities that enable website blocking at the browser level is a slippery slope. While it might be leveraged only for malware and phishing in France today, it will set a precedent and create the technical capability within browsers for whatever a government might want to restrict or criminalize in a given jurisdiction forever. A world in which browsers can be forced to incorporate a list of banned websites at the software-level that simply do not open, either in a region or globally, is a worrying prospect that raises serious concerns around freedom of expression. If it successfully passes into law, the precedent this would set would make it much harder for browsers to reject such requests from other governments.

We remain engaged in conversations with relevant stakeholders and hope that the final law leads to a more palatable outcome for the open internet.

 

 

An open letter about the Online 'Safety' Bill...

Civil society organisations urge UK to protect global digital security and safeguard private communication


Link Here28th June 2023
Full story: UK Government vs Encryption...Government seeks to restrict peoples use of encryption

To: Chloe Smith, Secretary of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
cc: Tom Tugendhat, Minister of State for Security, Home Office Paul Scully, Minister for Tech and the Digital Economy Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay

Dear Ms Smith, 

We are over 80 national and international civil society organisations, academics and cyberexperts. We represent a wide range of perspectives including digital human rights and technology.

We are writing to you to raise our concerns about the serious threat to the security of private and encrypted messaging posed by the UK's proposed Online Safety Bill (OSB).

The Online Safety Bill is a deeply troubling legislative proposal. If passed in its present form, the UK could become the first liberal democracy to require the routine scanning of people's private chat messages, including chats that are secured by end-to-end encryption. As over 40 million UK citizens and 2 billion people worldwide rely on these services, this poses a significant risk to the security of digital communication services not only in the UK, but also internationally.

End-to-end encryption ensures the security of communications for everyone on a network. It is designed so that no-one, including the platform provider, can read or alter the messages. The confidentiality between sender and recipient is completely preserved. That's why the United Nations, several human rights groups, and anti-human trafficking organisations alike have emphasised that encryption is a vital human rights tool.

In order to comply with the Online Safety Bill, platform providers would have to break that protection either by removing it or by developing work-arounds. Any form of work-around risks compromising the security of the messaging platform, creating back-doors, and other dangerous ways and means for malicious actors and hostile states to corrupt the system. This would put all users in danger.

The UK government has indicated its intention for providers to use a technology that would scan chats on people's phone and devices -- known as client-side scanning. The UK government's assertion that client-side scanning will not compromise the privacy of messages contradicts the significant evidence of cyber-security experts around the world. This software intercepts chat messages before they are encrypted, and as the user is uploading their images or text, and therefore confidentiality of messages cannot be guaranteed. It would most likely breach human rights law in the UK and internationally.

Serious concerns have also been raised about similar provisions in the EU's proposed Child Sexual Abuse Regulation, which an independent expert study warns is in contradiction to human rights rules. French, Irish and Austrian parliamentarians have all also warned of severe threats to human rights and of undermining encryption.

Moreover, the scanning software would have to be pre-installed on people's phones, without their permission or full awareness of the severe privacy and security implications. The underlying databases can be corrupted by hostile actors, meaning that individual phones would become vulnerable to attack. The breadth of the measures proposed in the Online Safety Bill -- which would infringe the rights to privacy to the same extent for the internet's majority of legitimate law-abiding users as it would for potential criminals -- means that the measures cannot be considered either necessary or proportionate.

The inconvenient truth is that it is not possible to scan messages for bad things without infringing on the privacy of lawful messages. It is not possible to create a backdoor that only works for good people and that cannot be exploited by bad people.

Privacy and free expression rights are vital for all citizens everywhere, in every country, to do their jobs, raise their voices, and hold power to account without arbitrary intrusion, persecution or repression. End-to-end encryption provides vital security that allows them to do that without arbitrary interference. People in conflict zones who rely on secure encrypted communications to be able to speak safely to friends and family as well as for national security. Journalists around the world who rely on the confidential channels of encrypted chat, can communicate to sources and upload their stories in safety.

Children, too, need these rights, as emphasised by UNICEF based on the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child. Child safety and privacy are not mutually exclusive; they are mutually reinforcing. Indeed, children are less safe without encrypted communications, as they equally rely on secure digital experiences free from their data being harvested or conversations intercepted. Online content scanning alone cannot hope to fish out the serious cases of exploitation, which require a whole-of-society approach. The UK government must invest in education, judicial reform, social services, law enforcement and other critical resources to prevent abuse before it can reach the point of online dissemination, thereby prioritising harm prevention over retrospective scanning.

As an international community, we are deeply concerned that the UK will become the weak link in the global system. The security risk will not be confined within UK borders. It is difficult to envisage how such a destructive step for the security of billions of users could be justified.

The UK Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, has said that the UK will maintain freedom, peace and security around the world. With that in mind, we urge you to ensure that end-to-end encrypted services will be removed from the scope of the Bill and that the privacy of people's confidential communications will be upheld.

Signed,

Access Now, ARTICLE 19: Global Campaign for Free Expression, Asociatia pentru Tehnologie Ui Internet (ApTI), Associação Portuguesa para a Promoção da Segurança da Informação (AP2SI), Association for Progressive Communications (APC), Big Brother Watch, Centre for Democracy and Technology, Chaos Computer Club (CCC), Citizen D / Drzavljan D, Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), Community NeHUBs Africa, cyberstorm.mu, Defend Digital Me, CASM at Demos, Digitalcourage, Digitale Gesellschaft, DNS Africa Media and Communications, Electronic Frontier Finland, Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Electronic Frontier Norway, Epicenter.works, European Center for Not-for-Profit Law, European Digital Rights (EDRi), European Sex Workers Rights Association (ESWA), Fair Vote, Fight for the Future, Foundation for Information Policy Research, Fundación Cibervoluntarios, Global Partners Digital, Granitt, Hermes Center for Transparency and Digital Human Rights, Homo Digitalis, Ikigai Innovation Initiative, Internet Society, Interpeer gUG, ISOC Brazil -- Brazilian Chapter of the Internet Society, ISOC Ghana, ISOC India Hyderabad Chapter, ISOC Venezuela, IT-Pol, JCA-Net (Japan), Kijiji Yeetu, La Quadrature du Net, Liberty, McEvedys Solicitors and Attorneys Ltd, Open Rights Group, OpenMedia, OPTF, Privacy and Access Council of Canada, Privacy International, Ranking Digital Rights, Statewatch, SUPERRR Lab, Tech for Good Asia, UBUNTEAM, Wikimedia Foundation, Wikimedia UK

Professor Paul Bernal, Nicholas Bohm, Dr Duncan Campbell, Alan Cox, Ray Corrigan, Professor Angela Daly, Dr Erin Ferguson, Wendy M. Grossman, Dr Edina Harbinja, Dr Julian Huppert, Steve Karmeinsky, Dr Konstantinos Komaitis, Professor Douwe Korff, Petr Kucera, Mark A. Lane, Christian de Larrinaga, Mark Lizar, Dr Brenda McPhail, Alec Muffett, Riana Pferfferkorn, Simon Phipps, Dr Birgit Schippers, Peter Wells, Professor Alan Woodward


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